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MEMORANDIM FOR: The Headrable Robert McMamara

The Secretary of Defense Washington 25, D. C.

SUBJECT:

Recall of GIA U-2 Aircraft

- 1. Reliable photographic coverage of Cuba has held high priority in our national intelligence effort for more than one year now. On June 23, 1963, I directed that two U-2 aircraft be losned to SAC by the CIA so as to support the regular recommaissance activity with the most modern U-2 capability, and these aircraft were provided within three days. I felt that the additional performance of the CLA U-2s would provide important insurence against possible MIG-21 or SA-2 countersction.
- 2. During this past year, we have learned a good deal about Soviet and Guben defensive capabilities. It is clear that the SA-2 surface-to-air missile system -

bring down a lone U-2 unless it is armed with jammers. The SA-2 is equally effective against the SAC and ClA aircraft since the 4,000 ft. altitude differential is irrelevant to the high altitude capability of the 5A-2. It is my understanding that SAC has now configured several of its aircraft to carry jammers also, so that there is no real difference in electafe vulnerability.

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- 3. Our principal concern at the time of the original transfer was the potential threat posed by the HIG-21 in Guban hands. This threat has failed to materialise. Furthermore, we have gained intimate knowledge of the MIG-21 by clandestine means and feel that its eaximum ceiling capability is 60,000 ft. If the SAC aircraft are flown at the maximum mission altitude of 69,000 ft., this should not represent as much of a threat as the SA-2s which are now passing into Guban hands.
- 4. In the meantime, the has recently lost one U-2 in China and is running short on other fronts. The Detachment in Southeast Asia has only one U-2 and has no back-up aircraft, save the U-2 which was modified to carry the CORONA triple prime antellite camera in its initial tests over Cuba. Two aircraft are being modified for carrier operations at Lockheed. At the present, I am very concerned that the CIA operations are being atretched far too thin.
- 5. I believe that it is now time to return the two CIA U-Zs presently on loan to BAC for Cuban overflights. If a new threat materializes to the SAC program, we can examine the situation again to see if a second CIA transfusion can give us added tanurance. In the meantime, it is important to put the worldwice CIA program back on a sound footing with proper aircraft reserves, and I am requesting that the DMRO take immediate steps to insure the return of the two CIA aircraft to Edwards Air Force Base within the next ten days.

JOHN A. McCONE

cc: Director, HMO